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1.   Introduction 
 A  flexible,  well-functioning, and entrepreneurial labor market can contribute to 
economic growth through the efficient allocation of labor and increased competitiveness.  
A better understanding of the determinants of entrepreneurship – the environment that 
motivates and supports the creation of self-employment – is essential for understanding 
the microeconomic foundations of economic growth.  Conceptually, the self-employed 
can be considered as the smallest, but initially most vital unit of entrepreneurial activity. 
Self-employment was not considered conducive to growth until the 1970s, as it lacked in 
the emergence of scale economies and the specialization of labor (Blau, 1987). However, 
this negative trend was overturned in more recent years, and in the transition countries of 
Eastern and Central Europe, the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector has been the 
largest creator of new jobs and the vast majority of these new enterprises are small 
businesses (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2004; Klapper, Sarria-Allende and 
Sulla, 2004). Thus, the dynamics of this particular group are of great interest since the 
literature has indicated that the self-employed have distinct individual and labor market 
characteristics.  In the past few years, there has been a notable amount of interest on 
issues of labor market mobility and transition into self-employment in developing 
countries.   
Departing from this strand of the literature, we examine the nature of the 
entrepreneurial decision for the transition to self-employment in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH) and its viability, using a rich panel survey for the years 2001-2004.  BiH is both a 
country in transition that emerged from a communist background and post-conflict, 
following the violent collapse of the former Yugoslavia.  An interesting feature of this 
case study besides the rich dataset is that in the early period of the panel (2000-2001) the 
country changed its legal framework concerning labor regulation and the business 
environment.  Therefore, BiH offers an interesting setting to examine the dynamism of 
latent entrepreneurship that was restricted before the market reforms.   
The data allow us to directly identify individuals that switched to self-
employment.  Compared to studies treating self-employment per se as the dependent 
variable, the examination of entry into self-employment can provide a better insight into 
the social origin, financial circumstances, and career choices of new entrepreneurs.  Of   2
particular interest are issues of interactions between access to finance and labor status; the 
relationship between the informal sector and formal types of entrepreneurial activity; and 
the effects of pushing and pulling factors in the transition between market states.  Finally, 
we study the ex-post performance of new entrepreneurs in terms of their survival in the 
early period in business and the determinants of this performance.   
  Our results suggest an important role for financing constraints.  Specifically, 
wealthier households with access to bank financing are more likely to become 
entrepreneurs and survive the early period of adjustment.  Having an existing bank 
relationship significantly increases the chances of survival for the new entrepreneur, 
further reinforcing the importance of access to finance.  In contrast, we find that overseas 
– and in some cases domestic – remittances significantly decrease the likelihood of 
becoming an entrepreneur.  Finally, people working in the informal sector are more likely 
to transition to becoming entrepreneurs and more likely to survive. 
  The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the historic, macroeconomic 
and institutional background in BiH.  Section 3 discusses the data.  Section 4 presents our 
empirical strategy and results for self-employment entry.  Section 5 examines short-term 
survival.  Section 6 concludes.   
 
2.  The Labor Market and Business Environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
  The establishment of BiH has been marked by a four-year war in the early 1990s.  
Almost 6% of a 4.4 million population were killed or registered as missing, over 60% 
were forced to relocate, and an estimated 1,000,000 people left the country (World Bank, 
2005b).  In 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords decentralized BiH, retaining its international 
boundaries.  The decentralization recognized a second tier of government comprised of 
two entities roughly equal in size: the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska (RS).  
  The macroeconomic instability that followed was characterized by a 75% drop in 
per capita GDP between 1990 and 1995, from its initial US$2,400 level to an estimated 
US$600.  In the following years, high nominal rates of economic growth increased the 
figure to US$1,200 by the end of 2000 and to its prewar levels as of 2005 (World 
Development Indicators, 2006).  The conflict also generated new categories of   3
unemployed and in 1996 the official self-reported unemployment rate was 80%, which 
decreased to 35% by 2001.  However, BiH has a large informal sector that could account 
for as much as 50% of the official GDP and half of the registered unemployed.  
  Before the war, BiH had a large entrepreneurial middle-class.  Compared to most 
centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe, the regime in the former Yugoslavia had 
a somewhat different treatment of small businesses, mostly those related to crafts and 
services.  These were encouraged and provided with financing mostly from local 
government-owned banks.  Their interests were further supported through the formation 
of local and politically influential crafts unions.  Furthermore, BiH was a location where 
the former regime placed heavy manufacturing industries, on which socialist regimes 
placed a huge emphasis.  However, the transition process and the war altered the 
environment, and together with the destruction of the massive state-operated factories, 
unemployment skyrocketed (World Bank, 2002).   
  Facing massive unemployment and a deficient social welfare system, the 
promotion of self-employment and microenterprise became a political priority.  Several 
initiatives were taken to encourage small and medium enterprises by establishing 
microenterprise credit institutions.
1  Furthermore, in 2000-2001 BiH introduced reforms 
to the regulatory framework for the financial environment and the labor market.  The 
“Microcredit Organization” law passed the FBiH parliament in 2000 and the RS 
parliament in 2001, establishing a legal and operational framework for microfinance.   
Banking reform accelerated in 2001 as all Communist-era payment bureaus were closed 
and the banking sector was liberalized.  Foreign banks, primarily from Western Europe, 
now control most of the banking sector.  Moreover, one of the important barriers to labor 
mobility and job creation – the extremely restrictive employment protection legislation – 
was removed in 2000 and replaced by new Entity Labor Codes.   
  However, the labor market still faces major challenges, such as high and rigid 
wages in the formal sector, a large and growing share of workers in the informal sector 
who are not covered by social insurance, and persistent unemployment.  The formal 
sector remains dominated by the public sector and implementation of privatization has 
                                                 
1 Notably, the Local Initiatives Project funded by the World Bank, the Micro-Enterprise Bank funded by 
the EBRD and the IFC, and Quick Impact Program funded by the UNDP/SRRP.    4
been slow.
2  Further regulatory impediments include high taxation of wages and profits 
and high employer contributions, difficult access and high cost of credit, and lack of 
systemic trust in the regulatory and financial environment (World Bank, 2005a). As 
shown by the World Bank’s Doing Business (2005) indicators, BiH’s “Ease of Doing 
Business” ranking is only higher than the ranking of Belarus and the Ukraine among ECE 
transition countries.  In a total of 154 countries, the country ranks particularly low, with 
respect to ease of starting a business, dealing with licenses, registering property and 
trading across borders.  Given this challenging macroeconomic and institutional 
environment, in the next sections we examine determinants of self-employment 
transitions.  
 
3.  Measures of Entrepreneurship 
  We use household panel data from four waves of the World Bank Living 
Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) for the years 2001-2004.  The first wave of the 
LSMS survey was carried out in 2001, covering a sample of 5,400 households, 3,000 
from FBiH and 2,400 from RS.  The sample is representative at the country level, the 
entity level, and for urban, rural and mixed municipalities.  Wave 2 was conducted in 
2002 and 50% of original LSMS respondents were interviewed a second time.  These 
respondents were followed in Waves 3 and 4.
3  This unique panel data provides rich 
demographic and socioeconomic information, and importantly an insight into labor 
market dynamics in the two entities.   
  We employ the labor force population, aged 16-65, and classify them into 
mutually exclusive groups according to their employment status every year. Following 
the design of the questionnaire, we define self-employed individuals as individuals 
describing their status as owner/co-owner of: (i) an enterprise/small business which 
employs workers (“employer”), (ii) an enterprise/small business which does not employ 
workers (“own account”).  We identify “formal” self-employment, as individuals who fall 
                                                 
2 For a description of the SME sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see: World Bank (2002).  
3 For more information on the survey design, LSMS sampling and the creation of the panel and the 
contents, see World Bank (2003). Survey response rates were satisfying both at the household and the 
individual level, comparable to those of most well-established household surveys. The truncation of the 
sample after Wave 1 was conducted ensuring the continuation of representation at the 3 levels mentioned.    5
into the categories above and also declare work-related characteristics such as earnings 
and hours in self-employment and whose pension and/or health contributions are paid.   
  Standard ILO definitions classify a person as employed if they are presently 
working or on leave from a job.  We further distinguish between the formal and the 
informal sector workers among the group of employed.  We define employees in formal 
sector paid employment as individuals working in public enterprises and international 
organizations, as well as those in the private sector whose pension and health insurance 
contributions were paid.  Informal sector employment is comprised of three groups: (a) 
unpaid supporting family members, farmers on own farm, and workers engaged in other 
activity, such as sale of agricultural products; (b) workers not employed by public 
enterprises (or state sector) for which pension contributions are not paid; (c) workers 
declaring any other out-of-employment activity, but reporting earnings or hours of work.  
This definition meets previous official classification criteria and informal sector estimates 
for BiH (World Bank, 2002).  By default, the unemployed are those who do not presently 
have a job, are actively searching for employment, and are able to take a job if it were 
offered to them.  All others of working age are classified as inactive.  Individuals who are 
inactive in all waves are dropped.  
  For BiH and its two entities, Table 1 presents frequencies for the partitioning of 
the labor force.  Self-employed comprise about 5% of the workforce on average, a figure 
that is mostly constant over the period 2001-2004 (see Figure 1).  This compares to a self-
employment rate of about 10% in OECD countries (Haber, Lamas and Lichtenstein, 
1987;  Parker, 2005).  The percentage of self-employed is somewhat higher in RS, 
compared to FBiH.  Another striking feature of the labor market in BiH is the high share 
of employment in the informal sector. Our calculations indicate that informal 
employment accounts for more than one third of total employment.  There is an 8 
percentage point difference between the entities, with the RS having close to a quarter of 
the labor force in informal employment.  This is a relatively stable figure, while in FBiH 
the informal sector is lower but increasing in the course of the panel.  Finally, with 
respect to the unemployment statistics, our estimates verify the picture that 
unemployment-inactivity comprises more than 40% of the workforce, a figure   6
persistently lower in RS (38%, but rising) than in FBiH (46.2% on average).  Our 
estimates of involuntary unemployment are about 19% for both entities.   
  This labor status classification allows us to directly observe transitions to self-
employment from year to year.  We are able to identify 229 entries into self-employment 
status during the course of the panel (Table 2).  If we look at the subsample in 2001 of 
household heads, we identify 119 new entries (not shown)
4.  Of further interest are the 
outcomes of the new entries, as business start-ups bear the higher risk of failure during 
their first years of operation. Indeed, almost half of our observed transitions to self-
employment do not make it through their first year in business.  This is a pattern observed 
in both samples of individuals and household heads. Thus, it is of further interest to 
examine the determinants of entrepreneurial survival as well as entrepreneurial entry. The 
emphasis is placed on the role of labor market experience and issues of access to finance 
and financing constraints.    
  The next section provides the background to the empirical analysis of the 
determinants of self-employment transition in BiH, discusses the empirical strategy and 
presents the results. Then, Section 5 presents the results and discussion for the analysis of 
firm-survival in the sample.   
 
4.  Entry into Self-Employment 
Entrepreneurship has been linked to both economic and social attributes.  The 
literature has distinguished between the role of institutions, socioeconomic factors, 
individual characteristics, and psychological factors, in identifying the determinants of 
the decision to start an entrepreneurial activity (Djankov et al., 2005, 2006a, 2006b). 
Other studies emphasize the importance of labor market characteristics (Earle and 
Sakova, 2000; Dutz et al., 2001), as well as financial wealth and constraints (Paulson and 
Townsend, 2004; 2005;  Paulson et al., 2006). In the first stage of our analysis, we 
examine the microeconomic determinants of entry into self-employment in BiH, 
comparing differences in human, social and financial capital between groups of new 
entrepreneurs and individuals who did not become self-employed.  In a second stage, we 
                                                 
4 This latter sub-sample is of interest, despite reducing the number of observations, because it is likely to 
capture new business openings and exclude participation in family enterprises.     7
examine the determinants of survival in self-employment for more than one year, 
comparing individuals who made it through their first year as small business operators 
and individuals who exited before their second year of business.  The appendix provides 
definitions, means, and standard deviations for all variables in Table A1.  Table A2 
presents a correlation matrix between key variables.  
4.1  Wealth, Access to Finance and Financial Institutions 
  An important branch of the literature has examined the links between wealth and 
entrepreneurship. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) argue that borrowing constraints imply 
that personal assets will be positively related to the propensity of individuals to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities.  Survey evidence from Thai households indicates that 
individuals who switch to self-employment are more likely to be wealthier (Paulson and 
Townsend, 2004).  
The wealth proxy we use is the logarithm of equivalized per capita household 
consumption, LHHCONS, which is calculated by adjusting household consumption to the 
number of equivalent adults.
5 In transition countries, income under-reporting and non-
reporting biases the calculations based on income.  We therefore utilize household 
consumption in the beginning of the panel as an indicator of overall financial wealth.  
Using other wealth proxies, such as those that reflect property ownership or the ability to 
“make ends meet”, do not change our main results.   
  While there is significant evidence on the positive impact of wealth – 
instrumented or not (i.e., credit constraints) on entrepreneurial activity, empirical 
evidence on the role of financial institutions is relatively scarce.  Notably, Paulson and 
Townsend (2004) examine the impact of particular financial institutions on overcoming 
financial constraints and starting a business.  Departing from their work, we utilize 
household affiliation with particular financial institutions and sources of finance in the 
past and examine their impact on the likelihood of starting a new business.  The role of 
financial institutions is of particular interest in transition economies where the financial 
sector has undergone major reforms, and in BiH in particular, where the creation of 
                                                 
5 For full information concerning welfare in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the construction of the 2001 
consumption aggregates, see “Welfare in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2001: Measurement and Findings”, 
2001. The equivalized measure is calculated by adjusting household consumption to the number of 
equivalent adults: EA=(A+aK)
θ, where A: number of adults; K: number of children; a: economies of scale 
parameter; θ: share of public goods consumed parameter.    8
microfinance institutions has been financed and advertised by most major international 
financial institutions.  The anecdotal evidence is that in BiH working capital finance is 
widely available, but quite expensive and the availability of start-up loan and equity is 
still problematic.  Microcredit institutions on the other hand, target specific groups of the 
population.  We include a dummy MICROLOAN equal to 1 if the household received a 
loan from a microcredit institution (such as a credit union, cooperative, or NGO) in 2001.  
We also identify households that received a loan from a bank or government agency in 
2001, BANKLOAN, and households that received a loan from a family member, friend 
or other individual in 2001, INFORMLOAN.  Despite various initiatives, only about 
2.5% of our sample are members of households that received microloans, while about 
17% of individuals receive informal loans and about 12% of individuals receive bank 
loans. 
  Another important feature is the impact of international remittances on the local 
economy, as the number of immigrants from BiH to the West has been large. It has been 
argued that remittances and aid are not conducive to entrepreneurship or private sector 
development and reduce labor supply (Rodriguez and Tiongson, 2001).  These have been 
framed as “disincentive effects” (Ahlburg, 1995) or “crowding-out effects” (Connell and 
Brown, 2005).  On the other hand, there is also evidence that remittances can support 
private sector development (Funkhouser, 1992). Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) 
present evidence from Mexico, and after accounting for endogeneity in remittance 
receivership, show that its impact may vary by gender, region and sector.  Thus, 
remittances in Mexico appear to reduce male formal sector labor supply, as well as that of 
the self-employed.  On the contrary, its impact on informal sector labor supply is positive.  
We directly test the effect of remittances on the switch to self-employment with 
two dummies which importantly distinguish between international and domestic 
remittances:  REMITDOM, which equals 1 if the individual belongs to a household that 
received any money, gifts, or services from friends or family working in BiH; and 
REMITABROAD, which equals 1 if the household receives money, gifts or services 
from friends or family working abroad in 2001.  Our estimates indicate that 8.5% of 
households in the sample receive some form of remittance domestically and 11.5% from 
abroad.  We also identify individuals that receive money from humanitarian and religious   9
institutions that do not need repayment, GRANT.  These are of specific interest, because 
they include grants from foreign NGOs and citizen associations provided specifically to 
promote self- employment and entrepreneurship (Lyman, 2005).  Finally, we include 
SOCIALSERV, equal to 1 if a member of the individual’s household received financial 
assistance, such as payments from an old age or war veteran’s pension in 2001.   
4.2  Labor Market Experience 
  Past self-employment experience has been shown to exert significant effects on 
current employment status (i.e. Jovanovic’s (1982) “ability learning” view).  In addition, 
paid employment experience – particularly in small firms due to human capital 
acquisition – has been shown to have positive effects on the probability of becoming self-
employed and obtaining higher entrepreneurial income (Parker, 2004). 
  The role of informal sector experience in entry into self-employment and its 
success is still being debated. There are two dominant views on the issue, departing from 
different perceptions of the labor market and leading to opposite policy implications. The 
first view is that of labor market segmentation, where the informal sector is seen as the 
disadvantaged segment of a dual labor market in which workers queue for good jobs. 
Institutions such as labor unions, minimum wage legislation and public sector hiring 
practices tend to keep formal sector wages in urban areas above market-clearing levels, 
and the low-productivity informal sector provides a subsistence shelter for unmatched 
employees (Harris and Todaro, 1970).  Thus, employment in the informal sector is often 
seen as disguised unemployment. The notion of such a dual labor market was introduced 
in Lewis (1954), and further linked to size-dualism (Lucas, 1978) by a formalization into 
a general equilibrium model in Rauch (1991). Theoretical and empirical evidence 
supporting that view includes Loayza (1994), Chandra and Khan (1993), and Fields 
(2005).  
The second view is finance-based and stresses the role of the financial market and 
the regulatory environment in competitive labor markets when entrepreneurs and/or 
workers are heterogeneous in both the formal and the informal sector. Amaral and 
Quintin (2006) model the costs associated with producing in the informal sector as 
resulting from a limited access to formal means of contract enforcement. Straub (2005) 
develops a model where there is an entrance fee to formal entrepreneurship, granting   10
access to a public good identified with access to a better credit market. Further recent 
models include Paula and Scheinkman (2006) and Galiani (2007). Maloney (1999; 2004), 
Pratap and Quintin (2004) present empirical evidence from Latin America, against the 
segmentation view. Departing from Straub (2005), one can perceive the decision to be 
formal/informal taking place in a moral hazard framework with credit rationing. There, 
the decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality and the 
relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit mechanisms and their related 
institutional arrangements. In economies under transition, the regulatory environment 
might not foster formal entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial individuals might choose to 
operate in the informal sector or shadow economy. Indeed, the work by Djankov (2002) 
documents the existence of significant entry costs into formality, in the form of 
registration and license fees.  
Furthermore, thinking of Lazear’s (2004) view of entrepreneurs as “jacks of all 
trades”, one could perceive the informal sector as an incubator for formal sector 
entrepreneurship when the business environment improves. This prediction can also be 
acquired from Evans and Jovanovic (1989), according to whom individuals are more 
likely to gain in capital, knowledge and ability while working rather than when out of the 
labor market. Informality can be thought to allow a leader to explore the potential 
profitability of an industry without incurring significant sunk costs (Bennett and Estrin, 
2007). This could be of vital importance to the development process when the regulatory 
environment is poor, i.e. in several development countries where there is uncertainty 
about the future profitability of the new ventures (Hausman et al., 2000), and several 
adaptations are required to support the introduction/imitation of “new” production 
methods (Hausman and Rodrik, 2003).  
Neither of the two strands in the literature debates that informality involves tax 
evasion and unfair competition to the formal sector, which are significant impediments to 
growth.  Furthermore, the informal sector is characterized by low-pay and low job 
security among its employees and large-extent informality in an economy is an indicator 
of corruption, poor regulatory, financial and labor market environment. However, 
considering experience in “gray” or “unofficial” markets as providing valuable human 
capital and as an outlet to latent entrepreneurship has important policy implications for   11
the treatment of the informal sector after economic liberalization in the process of 
economic development (Kaufmann & Kaliberda, 1996; Johnson et al., 1997).
6  The most 
prominent one shifts the focus from the banning of informality to the operation of the 
financial market.  
4.3  Socioeconomic Characteristics and Psychological Traits  
  Theory and evidence suggest the following individual characteristics are likely to 
determine entry into self-employment:  Generally, there is a positive relationship with 
gender (male) and a positive concave relationship between self-employment occurrence 
and age and experience, with entry into self-employment peeking between the ages 35 
and 44.  The latter can be justified as “job shopping” in a process of learning and 
occupational matching (Miller, 1984).  The relationship between education and entry into 
self-employment is likely to depend on the econometric specification employed (Parker, 
2004).  With respect to marital status and family considerations, the dominant view is that 
of Borjas (1986), where family members can facilitate self-employment activity through 
the provision of assistance and cheap labor.  However, when entry into self-employment 
is considered, the evidence is not clear, and could be confounded by the fact that married 
population is generally less likely to take risks. Evidence on the impact of health status is 
mixed. It is likely that the disabled might prefer self-employment as a way out of 
employer discrimination. Furthermore, several microcredit schemes are targeted to these 
groups. Finally, entrepreneurial activity in terms of small businesses is more likely to 
occur in urban areas in more developed countries. However, the provision of labor and 
other factors of production can often be cheaper in rural areas.   
  Theory on the behavioral patterns of entrepreneurs stresses that the psychological 
profile and sociological background of individuals are important factors in the decision to 
initiate one’s own business. We will focus on two behavioral dimensions available in the 
dataset: optimism and risk-sharing and support through social capital. 
  Recent evidence suggests self-employed individuals are more optimistic than 
regular wage-earners. Entrepreneurial decisions involve greater risk-taking and are much 
likely to be influenced by attitudes, emotional predispositions and cognitive biases 
                                                 
6 Blau (1985) reviews the theoretical framework for a role for an informal sector in less developed 
countries.   12
(Arabsheibani et al., 2000; Puri and Robinson, 2005).  The difficulty has always been 
how to measure optimism. We construct an index OPTIMISM, which is the weighted 
average of the intensity measured by a 4-scale response in eight questions from the 
General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), related to mental health and anticipatory feelings.
7   
  Social capital is the set of social relationships an individual can draw on for 
various occasions. Gomez and Santor (2001) proxy for social capital using club 
membership, and find a positive effect on earnings from self-employment. We construct a 
proxy for social capital considerations, NOSOCPTL using the average of two available 
questions:  (i) "Is there anyone you can count on to listen to you when you need to talk?", 
and (ii) "Is there anyone who you can really count on to help you out in a crisis?"  These 
variables proxy for social capital in terms of the help people can get from friends, 
neighbors and relatives.  This is an “increased security effect”, a psychological safety net 
in the light of risk-sharing (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2006).   
The sociology literature has further stressed the role of family background in 
developing role models that can foster entrepreneurial aspirations and the empirical 
evidence is ample.  However, the data does not provide us with parental occupational or 
educational status variables.  In order to control for within family effects in self-
employment transitions we examine the impact of the presence of another self-employed 
member in the household, OTHERSE.  About 7% of the individuals in our sample have 
family members that are self-employed. 
 
4.4  Results 
  We model the decision to become self-employed in the years 2002-2004 in the 
probit framework, excluding individuals already self-employed in 2001. The list of 
explanatory variables involves demographic, psychological and sociological 
characteristics described in the last section and summarized in the appendix.  In separate 
specifications, we examine the impact of household financial wealth, the relationship 
with financial institutions, as well as the role of labour market experience and origins. 
  Table 3 presents summary statistics of the key variables, and differences in the 
means between individuals who were not self-employed in 2001 but chose to become 
                                                 
7 See Table 3 for the list of questions.   13
self-employed in the following years and those who did not.  Married men and urban 
residents are more likely to make the transition into self-employment.
8  Individuals who 
become self-employed tend to be better educated and assess themselves to be in better 
health.  Self-employed also significantly differ based on the optimism index and social 
capital variables, indicating that the new entrepreneurs had been more optimistic and had 
several more people around them to count on for support.   
  Self-employed are also more likely to transition from employment in the informal 
sector and to have someone else in their current household that is self-employed. 
Individuals who were unemployed or inactive in 2001 are less likely to switch to self-
employment at any point in the panel.  The differences between new entrepreneurs and 
non-entrepreneurs with respect to past household wealth and multiple property ownership 
are statistically significant, indicating a positive effect of own wealth in the self-
employment transition.  When it comes to the variables proxying for affiliation with 
financial institutions in the past, interestingly there are no differences between the groups, 
with respect to loan receivership either from banks or microcredit institutions or from 
informal sources.  This suggests that entry into self-employments might be financed with 
personal wealth as opposed to loans from formal or informal financial institutions.  The t-
tests between the means also suggest that individuals who receive remittances – 
particularly from abroad – or social services are less likely to become self-employed.  We 
add the caveat that individuals receiving remittances from abroad might also be less 
willing to invest in starting a local business because they hope to join family that 
emigrated overseas.  
  Next, we examine which of these interesting patterns persist in regression 
analysis.  Table 4 presents our probit estimation results for the determinants of the 
transition to self-employment. Marginal effects and robust z-statistics of the coefficients 
are reported in absolute values. Standard errors were clustered at the household level, to 
correct for intra-household correlations. Table 4 introduces the main specifications, with 
individual and household characteristics (column 1), household wealth – measured as 
                                                 
8 The number of new entrepreneurs does not significantly differ by ethnicity: Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian or 
other (not shown).    14
household consumption in 2001 (column 2), past employment status (column 3), and 
customer affiliation with financial institutions (columns 4-6).   
Results in the first two columns of Table 4 are consistent with the earlier 
differences in the means.  The newly self-employed is more likely to be male, aged 43, 
residing in an urban area, married, with some formal education, in good health, and with 
past self-employment experience.  The effects of the proxies for optimism and social 
capital persist, and are significant both when included together and separately. The 
inclusion of the household consumption variable in Column 2 indicates a significant 
positive effect of past wealth on current self-employment.  This suggests that self-
employed rely on their own financial means in making their decision.  
Column 3 examines the impact of past employment experience and indicates that 
ceteris paribus, informal sector employees are more likely to enter self-employment 
compared to employees in paid employment. On the contrary, individuals coming from 
unemployment-inactivity are the ones least likely to start their own business. The 
interpretation can either consider informal sector employees to be more entrepreneurial, 
or highlight the lighter opportunity costs that the transition to self-employment entails for 
formal sector employees, who are already receiving higher premia and other non-
pecuniary provisions. In order to shed some more light on this issue, we also examine the 
interaction between labor market origins and access to finance, and examine the survival 
chances of the new start-ups, with prior status as an explanatory variable.   
 Results in Columns 4-6 indicate that the decision to become an entrepreneur is 
unrelated to an existing relationship with financial institutions, confirming that these 
institutions rarely finance entry into self-employment.
9  However, remittances from 
abroad exhibit a significantly negative effect on the probability of an individual becoming 
self-employed, in accordance with the “disincentive effects” of remittances noted in the 
literature.  This effect is economically significant – an individual who switches from not 
                                                 
9 Since receivership of several types of loans and remittance money are not mutually exclusive, we have 
also conducted the analysis incorporating one variable at a time. All results presented are robust to these 
separate specifications and are available upon request. The inclusion of interaction terms between wealth 
and the affiliation with financial institution renders insignificant estimates of these interaction terms. This is 
likely to reflect the general climate of distrust towards the financial institutions that exist in BiH. During the 
war all household savings vanished and after the war several informal pyramid schemes cost households 
money. Furthermore, the network of banks and microfinance institutions are still considered very 
expensive.   15
receiving overseas remittances to receiving payments is on average about 3.5% less likely 
to start a business.  To the contrary, transfers from institutional sources, such as charities 
and potentially international NGO initiatives have a positive impact on the probability to 
become self-employed.  These results hold with the inclusion of the wealth variable.  This 
result is economically large – an unemployed individual who receives a grant is 13% 
more likely to become self-employed, while individuals employed in the formal and 
informal sector are 17% and 21% more likely to become self-employed, respectively.  
However, the use of these products is small in the overall sample (about 2% of 
individuals in our sample), which reduces the importance of this effect.  Finally, we fail 
to see a positive effect of informal financing mechanisms – from friends or family – or 
formal microfinance institutions.   
The results in Table 4 suggest an insignificant relationship between most formal 
sources of finance and the decision to start new business. Tables 5 and 6 examine the 
robustness of our main findings, by presenting (a) interaction effects between the key 
variables and (b) estimation results for separate groups of intuitive interest, respectively. 
Table 5 introduces interaction effects in the probit framework. An important point of 
caution is that in non-linear models, interaction effects can not be calculated in the same 
way as in linear regressions (Ai and Norton, 2003; Norton, Wang and Ai, 2004). Not 
accounting for the non-linearity can lead to misleading estimates of the interaction effect 
and can impact all sign, magnitude and significance of the coefficient of the interaction 
variable. We thus utilize the framework and routine provided by Norton, Wang and Ai 
(2004), to calculate interaction effects between key variables in Table 5.  
The specifications are all similar to Column 1 of Table 6, plus the two variables to 
be interacted and the interaction term. A summary of the interaction terms suggests a 
negative correlation between informal sources of finance and wealth. This is the case for 
informal loans and domestic remittances. The interaction term exerts a negative impact 
on the transition to self-employment, significant at the 10% level. The second significant 
interaction effect worth mentioning is the interaction between microcredit schemes and 
labor market origins. Informal sector employees provided with a micro-loan are 
significantly more likely to start their own business. This is not the case with formal-
sector-employees and those not previously employed, none of which is observed to   16
become self-employed when provided with a loan from a micro-credit scheme. 
Furthermore, while interactions between formal means of finance and labor origins are 
not observed to be significant, the averages in the table suggest that informal sector 
employees are much less likely to be granted access to formal finance.    
In Table 6 we present estimates for three subsamples of individuals.  First, in 
Columns 1-2, we include only the sample of the 2001 household heads. Most findings 
persist, except for the gender and education differentials. Furthermore, more household 
heads appear to be initiating self-employment activities in RS.  In addition, at the 
household head level, the effect of receiving overseas remittances is no longer significant, 
although the coefficient is still negative.  However, transfers from NGOs continue to have 
a positive impact on self-employment in the sample of household heads.  Columns 3 and 
4  exclude farmers in our 2001 sample and find that all prior results are robust. In 
particular, we find that self-employed individuals continue to be significantly more likely 
to transition from the informal sector, which suggests that this result is not driven by 
possible employment diversification of farmers. Finally, Columns 5 and 6 restrict the 
analysis to the sample of individuals in paid employment in 2001, either formally or in 
the informal sector, from which almost 80% of the inflows to self-employment are 
derived.  We see that all findings hold and are further reinforced in these specifications.  
Ceteris paribus, informal sector employees are more likely to enter self-employment 
compared to employees in paid employment.  The inclusion of both past wealth and past 
employment status, together with an interaction term between the two terms render all 
three variables insignificant indicating a significant negative correlation between wealth 
and informal sector activity. With respect to sources of finance, examination of the sub-
sample of individuals employed in 2001 reinforces the magnitude of the negative impact 
of remittances from abroad and the positive effect of charity/NGO money.  
In Table 7 we show results from a multinomial probit analysis, where the 
dependent variable takes a value of 0 if the individual switches to self-employment with 
employees (NEWSE-EMP), a value of 1 if the individual switches to self-employment 
without employees (NEWSE-OA), and the value of 2 if the individual never switches to 
self-employment.  Results are consistent with the last Tables. However, there are some 
interesting differences.  For instance, only entrepreneurs with employees are significantly   17
more optimistic, which might indicate the willingness to take a risk not only on your own 
behalf but also on the livelihood of others.  In addition, only own account entrepreneurs 
are less likely to receive a pension and only employers are significantly less likely to 
switch from unemployment. Furthermore, only employers are significantly less likely to 
receive remittances from abroad, which adds further evidence that remittances many not 
be used for productive purposes. Finally, results indicate that bank loan affiliation is 
associated with employment creation upon entering self-employment. Reasonably, larger 
firms require greater up-front capital.  
 
5.  Firm Survival 
5.1   Self-employment Performance 
The literature has examined several definitions and measures of success and 
performance in self-employment, such as self-employment earnings, firm size, 
employment creation, firm growth, and longevity in self-employment, defined either as 
years of duration in business or as survival during a particular time interval. Given the 
fact that our panel only covers the period 2001-2004, we examine the individual-specific 
determinants of survival in self-employment for more than one year
10.  Table 2 has 
already indicated that 47.8% of individuals (53.1% of household heads) becoming self-
employed during the years 2002-2003 in BiH quit their new entrepreneurial venture 
during their first year of activity.  It is well-known that new entrepreneurs bear the 
highest risk of failure during their first few years of activity.  Although firm and sector-
specific determinants are also of vital importance, the nature of the database only enables 
individual-specific analysis.  Given the particularities of BiH’s labor market and business 
environment, the determinants of small business viability are of great interest to 
authorities, the international institutions that have been involved in reforming the 
regulatory environment, as well as commercially oriented institutions, such as banks and 
microcredit institutions.  Ex ante evaluation of firm survival rates can offer information 
on which firms are more likely to survive and benefit from being granted funding with a 
                                                 
10 Observations of an individual in self-employment for two consecutive years do not necessarily establish 
survival in the same entrepreneurial activity. In order to ensure that survival in self-employment is captured 
we consider as “survivors”, individuals declaring their status as self-employed in at least two consecutive 
years and with activity tenure more than a year in the second year of observation.   18
loan or other sources of microfinance.  Firms that survive the market selection process in 
the first years of existence are the ones the economy might actually benefit from. 
  With respect to the individual-specific determinants of self-employment survival, 
Cooper et al. (1994) find that firms with a male entrepreneur have a greater probability of 
high growth, but not of survival.  Other studies have shown that the probability of 
survival increases with firm’s age, and further with owner’s age and education (Parker, 
2004). Jovanovic (1982) has described that entrepreneurs with higher human capital 
might be faced with less uncertainty and learn faster about market conditions and 
adjusting capacity, therefore reducing the probability of exit.   
  With respect to financial variables, the evidence is often mixed: Using U.S. data, 
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) find that liquidity constraints play a key role in small firm 
viability; Astebrö and Bernhardt (2003) find a negative correlation between having a 
bank loan and small business survival and a positive correlation between having a non-
bank loan and survival.  In contrast, Faznzylber et al (2006) find that formal credit, such 
as bank loans, is significant in explaining firm survival in Mexico. Cressy (1996) uses 
U.K. data to assert that the correlation between access to finance and survival is spurious, 
with human capital being the true driving force.  
Concerning past employment history, if the main incentive for starting a business 
is a “pushing” mechanism out of unemployment-inactivity or self-subsistence activities, 
there may not be time to look for good opportunities, make detailed plans and seek for 
advice.  Thus, independent from productivity and/or learning effects that occur after start-
up, chances of survival may be affected by selection effects occurring prior to start-up.  
On the other hand individuals starting from employment are more likely to be in a 
position to raise more capital and set up larger and better equipped businesses, based on 
their higher earnings and more prestigious professional status as employees. 
 5.2    Results 
In this section we examine the post-entry performance of individuals becoming 
self-employed in BiH during the period 2002-2003.  In order to examine the determinants 
of survival of the new self-employed within their first year in business, we employ a 
probit model with sample selection (van de Ven and van Praag, 1981). Results in Table 8   19
present marginal effects from Heckman two-step probit equations.
11  In the first stage, we 
estimate the probability of becoming self-employed in the years 2002-2003.  Our 
specifications are similar to those in Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Table 4.  In the second 
stage we estimate the probability of remaining self-employed in the year following that of 
transition.  The dependent variable is a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent 
remained self-employed in the following year and 0 if not.  As identifying restrictions in 
the second stage equation, we exclude the variables capturing optimism and pension 
receivership.  Besides satisfying the statistical criteria, it seems intuitive that those two 
variables, captured in the beginning of the panel, will have an effect on the decision to 
become self-employed, but will not affect entrepreneurial outcomes in any way. Wald χ
2 
test-statistics testing the null hypothesis of independent equations reject the null in Table 
8, rendering a positive correlation coefficient between the two equations.  This indicates 
that unobserved variables such as ability, talent etc. that positively affect the decision to 
become self-employed also exhibit a positive impact on the survival chances of the new 
business ventures.  
Income as measured by household consumption at the initial year in the panel has 
a persistently positive effect in the survival equation, indicating that higher potential of 
self-financing is an essential component of self-employment activity and longevity in 
BiH.  Among the variables capturing sources of finance and membership in financial 
institutions, it is the bank loan variable that exerts a significantly positive effect in the 
survival equation.  This finding is further reinforced by the positive impact of the variable 
capturing transfers from NGO programs.  This could be attributed to the good screening 
mechanisms of the financial institutions with respect to the entrepreneurial prospects of 
the individuals they choose to finance.  Hence, while the decision to become an 
entrepreneur is not related to financing from banks, the ability to survive is significantly 
increased by an existing relationship with a bank.  Consistent with our earlier findings, 
domestic remittances and social benefits discourage entrepreneurship and do not improve 
the probability of success.  
                                                 
11 We also estimated a Multinomial Probit model (self-employed/survivor, self-employed/failed, not self-
employed) and our main results proved robust (not shown).    20
Other results verify that men and urban area residents are more likely to survive 
the difficult first year in self-employment.  A positive concave relationship exists with 
age, but the maximum occurs at a younger age compared to the first stage equation.  
Education increases the probability of survival ceteris paribus, and so do previous self-
employment experience and the existence of another self-employed member in the 
household.   
With respect to the past employment origins of the “survivors”, the results 
indicate that the informal sector is likely to act as an “incubator” of formal 
entrepreneurial ventures in the early years of transition. Informal sector employees are 
more likely to become self-employed than formal sector employees, and further more 
likely to make it through their first year.  
 
6. Conclusions 
We examine the factors affecting the transition to self-employment and the 
viability of transitions in the short-run in BiH, employing a longitudinal household survey 
for the years 2001-2004.  This is an interesting case study, since in 2000-2001 several 
regulatory changes concerning the financial and business environment, as well as the 
labor market, were implemented.  Although the aggregate proportion of the self-
employed labor force did not increase over the sample period, examining transitions into 
self-employment indicated that even after controlling for the role of individual and social 
characteristics, financing constraints played an important role in promoting entry into 
self-employment and its success.  Specifically, wealthier households are more likely to 
become entrepreneurs and survive the early period in business, emphasizing the 
importance of internal finance.  Variables indicating financial institution customer 
affiliation, in terms of loans from formal financial institutions, or even informal sources 
that one needs to repay, have insignificant impact on self-employment transitions, but a 
positive effect on sustainable self-employment.  Particularly an existing prior relationship 
with a bank significantly increases the chances of survival for new entrepreneurs, 
suggesting that while banks rarely finance entry decisions, they are still instrumental in 
survival.    21
Furthermore, our results indicate that individuals working in the informal sector 
are more likely to transition to formal sector self-employment and are more likely to be 
successful as entrepreneurs. Further interactions between prior labor market status and 
access to finance measures indicate that informal sector employees are more likely to 
have access to informal sources of finance, rather than from formal institutions. However, 
the interaction term between loans from micro-credit schemes and informal sector 
employment exerts a significantly positive impact to new business start-ups. This 
indicates that this particular means of poverty alleviation and venture support, sponsored 
by the international community, has worked in the direction of promoting new start-ups 
and alleviating financial exclusion of particular population groups.  These results can be 
thought to support the perception of informal sector as an incubator for self-employment 
in the formal sector in the early years of transition, through which individuals acquire 
skills that can facilitate their future entrepreneurial activities.   
Finally, we find that overseas – and in some case domestic – remittances 
significantly decrease the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur.  These results support 
the disincentive effects that were documented in the earlier literature.  However, the large 
migration from Bosnia during the war might make this a special case, where families 
receiving remittances are less likely to invest in local businesses as they hope to join 
family overseas.  Interestingly, NGO and government supported programs that provide 
grants and transfers to promote entrepreneurship seem to have worked not only in 
promoting entrepreneurship but also its success, however less than 2% of our sample had 
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Table 1: Labor Force Composition in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
(“Living in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 2001-2004 averages) 
 
 BiH FBiH RS 
Self-Employed 4.76%  4.26%  5.35% 
Employers 2.20%  2.05%  2.37% 
Own-Account 2.56%  2.21%  2.98% 
Paid Employees  52.75%  49.54%  56.60% 
Formal Sector  31.71%  31.94%  31.43% 
Informal Sector  21.04%  17.60%  25.17% 
Non-Employed 42.49%  46.20%  38.05% 
Unemployed 18.85%  18.69%  19.06% 
Inactive 23.64%  27.51%  18.99% 
No. Observations  21,035  11,468  9,567 
No. Individuals  5,599  3,085  2,530   27
 
Table 2: New entries to self-employment and exits of new entrants within one year  
(Individuals not self-employed in 2001) 
 







Total  BiH  229   88 (47.8%)  96 (52.2%) 
EMPLOYERS 
Total  BiH  98   37 (43.5%)  48 (56.5%) 
OWN-ACCOUNT 
Total  BiH  131   51 (51.5%)  48 (48.5%) 
 














t-test: SE  
 
(1) vs. (4) 
t-test  
 
(2) vs. (3) 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Individual and Household  Characteristics:  
MALE 69.00%  60.20% 75.57% 50.49%  5.50  ***  -2.51  ** 
AGE  37.67  37.81 37.57 35.71  2.25  **  0.16     
FBiH  49.34%  48.98% 49.62% 55.62%  -1.87  *  -0.10     
URBAN  51.09%  55.10% 48.09% 43.75%  2.19  **  1.05     
MARRIED  75.55%  78.57% 73.28% 60.28%  4.64  ***  0.92     
LCHILDREN  0.79  0.77 0.80 0.65  3.42  ***  -0.46     
EDLOW  21.83%  17.35% 25.19% 34.83%  -4.06  ***  -1.42     
DISABLED  2.62%  1.02% 3.82% 4.70%  -1.47      -1.31     
GHEALTH  49.34%  59.18% 41.98% 37.24%  3.70  ***  2.60  *** 
PASTSE 12.23%  14.29%  10.69%  1.70%  10.85 ***  0.82    
OPTIMISM  92.50%  93.48% 91.76% 90.07%  3.35  ***  1.59     
NOSCPTL  6.11%  9.18%  3.82%  20.22%  -5.27 ***  1.68 * 
PENSION 36.24%  47.96%  27.48%  34.30%  0.61     3.25 *** 
INFORMAL 37.55%  23.47%  48.09%  20.09%  6.39 ***  -3.92 *** 
NONEMPLOYED 21.40%  20.41%  22.14%  44.95%  -7.06 ***  -0.31    
OTHSE  16.59%  13.27%  19.08%  6.25%  6.15 ***  -1.17    
HSOWN  69.87%  72.45% 67.94% 67.80%  0.66      0.73     
PROPERTY  22.71%  20.41% 24.43% 16.64%  2.40  **  -0.72     
LHHCONS 8.04  8.13  7.96  7.82  6.16 ***  2.47 ** 
Wealth and Financial Characteristics: 
INFORMLOAN 16.16%  10.20%  20.61%  17.17%  -0.40     -2.13 ** 
MICROLOAN  2.62%  3.06% 2.29% 2.55%  0.07      0.36     
BANKLOAN  13.97%  20.41% 9.16% 11.51%  1.14     2.45  ** 
REJLOAN  11.35%  8.16%  13.74%  10.57%  0.38     -1.32    
REMITDOM 5.24%  3.06%  6.87%  8.59%  -1.79 *  -1.28    
REMITABROAD  6.99%  2.04%  10.69%  11.57%  -2.14 **  -2.56 ** 
GRANT  2.62%  2.04% 3.05% 2.06%  0.59      -0.47     
SOCIALSERV 22.71%  20.41%  24.43%  27.68%  -1.65 *  -0.72    
Interactions 
LHHCONS*INFORMAL 3.02  1.95  3.82  1.55  6.88 ***  -3.68 *** 
LHHCONS*UNEMPLOYED 1.74  1.66  1.80  3.46  -6.61 ***  -0.30    
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source:  World Bank LSMS (2001-04).  See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
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Table 4: The determinants of the transition to self-employment 
Probit regressions, dependent variable: (1/0) New self-employed/Not 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
MALE                                                       0.028  0.030  0.022  0.029  0.030  0.022 
                                                           [5.93]***  [6.11]***  [4.88]***  [6.01]*** [6.21]***  [4.98]*** 
FBiH                                                       -0.006  -0.006  -0.003  -0.007  -0.007  -0.005 
                                                           [1.29]     [1.16]     [0.72]     [1.53]     [1.47]     [0.98]    
AGE                                                        0.006  0.006  0.005  0.006  0.006  0.005 
                                                           [4.45]***  [4.07]***  [3.60]***  [4.53]*** [4.17]***  [3.72]*** 
AGESQ/1,000                                                -0.070  -0.069  -0.057  -0.069  -0.069  -0.056 
                                                           [4.16]***  [3.96]***  [3.40]***  [4.22]*** [4.07]***  [3.52]*** 
URBAN                                                      0.008  0.008  0.010  0.008  0.007  0.009 
                                                           [1.69]*    [1.65]*    [1.99]**   [1.58]     [1.51]     [1.89]*   
MARRIED                                                    0.010  0.012  0.009  0.010  0.013  0.009 
                                                           [1.54]     [1.79]*    [1.44]     [1.62]     [1.94]*    [1.52]    
LCHILDREN                                                  0.002  0.005  0.002  0.002  0.005  0.002 
                                                           [0.31]     [0.82]     [0.40]     [0.28]     [0.85]     [0.34]    
EDUCLOW                                                    -0.015  -0.013  -0.015  -0.015  -0.013  -0.015 
                                                           [3.00]***  [2.54]**   [3.28]***  [3.11]*** [2.66]***  [3.39]*** 
DISABLED                                                   -0.017  -0.016  -0.017  -0.016  -0.015  -0.016 
                                                           [2.53]**   [2.30]**   [2.79]***  [2.47]**   [2.23]**   [2.80]*** 
PASTSE                                                     0.190  0.178  0.155  0.186  0.174  0.150 
                                                           [4.33]***  [4.01]***  [3.80]***  [4.27]*** [3.94]***  [3.73]*** 
OPTIMISM                                                   0.062  0.051  0.061  0.060  0.047  0.059 
                                                           [2.61]***  [2.08]**   [2.64]***  [2.58]*** [1.96]*    [2.59]*** 
NOSOCPTL                                                   -0.025  -0.024  -0.024  -0.026  -0.025  -0.024 
                                                           [5.91]***  [5.42]***  [5.86]***  [6.43]*** [5.98]***  [6.38]*** 
PENSION                                                    -0.011  -0.014  -0.008  -0.012  -0.015  -0.009 
                                                           [2.29]**   [2.94]***  [1.31]     [2.64]*** [3.34]***  [1.48]    
OTHERSE                                                    0.061  0.050  0.060  0.060  0.048  0.059 
                                                           [3.63]***  [3.27]***  [3.67]***  [3.55]*** [3.17]***  [3.60]*** 
LHHCONS                                                         -        0.021       -             -        0.022       -       
                                                                        [4.59]***                            [4.88]***              
INFORMAL                                                        -            -       0.019       -            -       0.020 
                                                                                     [2.05]**                             [2.07]**  
NONEMPLOYED                                                 -             -        -0.012       -             -        -0.011 
                                                                                     [1.75]*                              [1.68]*   
INFORMLOAN                                                    -            -            -       -0.002  -0.005  -0.002 
                                                                                                  [0.32]     [0.84]     [0.39]    
MICROLOAN                                                      -             -             -        -0.005  -0.006  -0.007 
                                                                                                  [0.43]     [0.59]     [0.76]    
BANKLOAN                                                       -            -            -       0.010  0.009  0.009 
                                                                                                  [1.21]     [1.03]     [1.15]    
REMITDOM                                                        -             -             -        -0.009  -0.008  -0.008 
                                                                                                  [1.44]     [1.26]     [1.25]    
REMITABROAD                                                  -            -            -       -0.012  -0.013  -0.012 
                                                                                                  [2.20]**   [2.50]**   [2.21]**  
GRANT                                                       -             -             -        0.069  0.091  0.076 
                                                                                                  [1.92]*    [2.16]**   [1.97]**  
SOCIALSERV                                                     -            -            -       -0.0003  0.001  -0.00003 
                                                                                                  [0.05]     [0.14]     [0.01]    
            
No. of Individuals                                         5,277  5,051  5,277  5,277  5,051  5,277 
Observed Transitions                                        229  228  229  229  228  229 
Pseudo R2                                                  0.121  0.131  0.135  0.129  0.141  0.143 
Log-Likelihood                                             -827.9  -807.2  -815.4  -820.6  -798.4  -807.8 
Log-Lik. at 1st iteration                            -942.4  -929.1  -942.4  -942.4  -929.1  -942.4 
Wald x2                                                    194.9***  192.2***  213.5***  223.2*** 218.0***  235.9*** 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source:  World Bank LSMS (2001-04).  See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
Marginal Effects and Robust z-statistics of the coefficients, in absolute values, are presented in parentheses.  
Standard Errors are clustered at the household level.  
For dummy variables, the difference in the predicted value of the dependent variable for discrete changes (0  1) is 
reported. For continuous variables, the derivatives of the predicted dependent variable for small changes in the exogenous 
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Table 5: Interaction Effects 
Probit regressions, dependent variable: (1/0) New self-employed/Not 
Coefficients [z-statistics] / Means if Variable==1 (Standard Deviations) 
 
Variable LHHCONSxVariable POORxVariable FORMALxVariable INFORMALxVariable UNEMPLOYEDxVariable 
FORMAL    -0.019  [1.31]  0.008  [0.62]  -   -   -  
 7.92  (0.51)  18.51%  (0.39)             
                    
INFORMAL  0.008  [0.78]  0.012  [0.55]  -   -   -  
 7.84  (0.55)  26.71%  (0.44)             
                    
UNEMPLOYED  0.009  [0.08]  -0.013  [0.96]  -   -   -  
 7.75  (0.50)  30.36%  (0.46)             
                    
INFORMLOAN -0.022*  [1.72] 0.002  [0.14]  -0.002 [0.13]  -0.017  [0.85]  0.012  [0.84] 
  7.87 (0.55)  25.27% (0.43)  31.40% (0.46)  27.13% (0.44)  41.47% (0.49) 
                   
MICROLOAN   -0.004  [0.16]  0.019  [0.46]  (NEW_SE=0) 0.110*  [1.82]  (NEW_SE=0) 
  7.96 (0.45)  19.12% (0.39)  34.56% (0.48)  23.53% (0.43)  41.91% (0.50) 
                    
BANKLOAN -0.001  [0.06]  0.027  [0.98]  -0.028 [1.39]  0.033  [0.94]  0.012  [0.59] 
  7.92 (0.47)  20.00% (0.40)  47.74% (0.50)  15.32% (0.36)  36.94% (0.48) 
                    
REMITDOM -0.032*  [1.67]  0.046**  [1.98]  0.010 [0.54]  -0.009 [0.41]  0.002  [0.22] 
  7.81 (0.49)  25.28% (0.44)  27.27% (0.45)  17.74% (0.38)  54.99% (0.50) 
                    
REMITABROAD -0.008 [0.78]  0.023 [1.16]  -0.017 [1.03]  0.004  [0.09]  0.016  [1.09] 
  7.87 (0.49)  20.76% (0.41)  31.96% (0.47)  20.10% (0.40)  47.94% (0.50) 
                    
GRANT   0.007  [0.18]  -0.011  [0.19]  0.127 [1.33]  (NEW_SE=0)  -0.029  [0.44] 
  7.60 (0.55)  34.23% (0.48)  22.52% (0.42)  12.61% (0.33)  64.86% (0.48) 
                    
SOCIALSERV -0.0004  [0.01]  0.002  [0.14]  -0.012 [0.87]  0.00003 [0.01]  0.010  [0.75] 
  7.81 (0.51)  25.99% (0.44)  26.47% (0.44)  21.96% (0.41)  51.57% (0.50) 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source:  World Bank LSMS (2001-04).  See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
Standard Errors are clustered at the household level.  
The specifications are as in Column1 of Table 6, plus Variable, Interaction Variable and Interaction Term.  










































Table 6: Robustness Regressions 
[Probit regressions, dependent variable: (1/0) New self-employed/Not] 
 
                                                           Household Heads  Excluding Farmers  Formally Employed in 2001 
                                                             (1)      (2)       (3)      (4)       (5)       (6)    
MALE                                                  0.014  0.009  0.031  0.022  0.033  0.030 
                                                           [0.93]     [0.56]     [6.19]***  [4.89]***  [4.38]***  [4.06]*** 
FBiH                                                    -0.018  -0.012  -0.006  -0.003  -0.004  -0.004 
                                                           [1.83]*    [1.24]     [1.19]     [0.76]     [0.44]     [0.54]    
AGE                                                     0.008  0.007  0.006  0.005  0.004  0.006 
                                                           [2.21]**   [1.88]*    [4.11]***  [3.65]***  [1.59]     [2.27]**  
AGESQ/1,000                                     -0.103  -0.086  -0.069  -0.055  -0.053  -0.066 
                                                           [2.39]**   [1.97]**   [3.98]***  [3.39]***  [1.66]*    [2.20]**  
URBAN                                               0.020  0.023  0.008  0.009  0.020  0.021 
                                                           [1.98]**   [2.25]**   [1.56]     [1.86]*    [2.22]**   [2.43]**  
MARRIED                                          0.035  0.033  0.016  0.012  0.021  0.018 
                                                           [2.96]***  [2.69]***  [2.49]**   [2.06]**   [2.00]**   [1.82]*   
LCHILDREN                                      -0.002  -0.014  0.002  -0.001  0.006  0.002 
                                                           [0.19]     [1.26]     [0.34]     [0.18]     [0.58]     [0.21]    
EDUCLOW                                         -0.012  -0.020  -0.013  -0.014  -0.014  -0.020 
                                                           [1.18]     [2.02]**   [2.57]**   [3.14]***  [1.53]     [2.31]**  
DISABLED                                         -0.031  -0.034  -0.016  -0.016  -0.017  -0.020 
                                                           [2.63]***  [3.33]***  [2.31]**   [2.82]***  [1.21]     [1.61]    
PASTSE                                              0.100  0.089  0.212  0.181  0.148  0.143 
                                                           [2.12]**   [1.99]**   [3.87]***  [3.67]***  [3.25]***  [3.23]*** 
OPTIMISM                                         0.114  0.117  0.049  0.064  0.064  0.089 
                                                           [2.42]**   [2.45]**   [2.06]**   [2.81]***  [1.51]     [2.17]**  
NOSCPTL                                           -0.024  -0.024  -0.024  -0.023  -0.040  -0.039 
                                                           [2.04]**   [2.07]**   [5.78]***  [6.06]***  [5.18]***  [5.39]*** 
PENSION                                            -0.041  -0.010  -0.017  -0.010  -0.036  -0.015 
                                                           [3.43]***  [0.74]     [3.69]***  [1.65]*    [3.85]***  [1.25]    
OTHERSE -  -  0.045  0.056  0.069  0.077 
        [3.04]***  [3.46]***  [2.67]***  [2.90]*** 
LHHCONS                                          0.042  -  0.022  -  0.025  - 
                                                           [4.38]***             [4.93]***             [3.11]***              
INFORMAL                                        -  0.063  -  0.022  -  0.029 
                                                                       [2.83]***              [2.10]**               [2.23]**  
NONEMPLOYED                              -  -0.008  -  -0.011  -  - 
                                                                       [0.53]                 [1.65]*        
INFORMLOAN                                  -0.021  -0.019  -0.003  -0.0005  -0.011  -0.007 
                                                           [1.95]*    [1.78]*    [0.52]     [0.08]     [1.11]     [0.70]    
MICROLOAN                                     0.022  0.007  -0.005  -0.006  0.008  0.004 
                                                           [0.58]     [0.24]     [0.45]     [0.63]     [0.32]     [0.17]    
BANKLOAN                                      -0.012 -0.010 0.007  0.008 0.003 0.005 
                                                           [0.90]     [0.70]     [0.81]     [0.97]     [0.27]     [0.38]    
REMITDOM                                       0.010  0.011  -0.011  -0.010  -0.009  -0.009 
                                                           [0.47]     [0.55]     [1.82]*    [1.66]*    [0.62]     [0.70]    
REMITABROAD                                -0.017  -0.013  -0.015  -0.014  -0.023  -0.022 
                                                           [1.50]     [1.06]     [3.00]***  [2.73]***  [2.48]**   [2.43]**  
GRANT                                               0.160  0.176  0.101  0.082  0.142  0.109 
                                                           [1.91]*    [2.01]**   [2.23]**   [2.02]**   [1.72]*    [1.49]    
REMITSOCIAL                                  0.019  0.012  0.0003  -0.0004  -0.002  -0.005 
                                                           [1.46]     [0.93]     [0.06]     [0.09]     [0.26]     [0.54]    
        
No. of obs.                                           1,839  1,842  4,824  5,050  2,856  2,967 
No. of households       2,182  2,368  1,760  1,855 
Pseudo R2                                            0.109  0.109  0.149  0.151  0.101  0.098 
Log-Likelihood                                    -392.9  -392.9  -752.8  -762.4  -601.6  -612.5 
Log-Likelihood at 1st iteration            -440.9  -441.1  -885.1  -898.3  -669.1  -678.8 
Wald x2                                                   82.6***     108.3***     212.7***     234.2***     113.4***     116.1*** 
 
Source: World Bank LSMS (2001-04). See Table 3 for variable definitions.  




Table 7: Multinomial probit regressions 
Dependent variable: (1) New S.E. employer, (2) New S.E. own-account (3) Never S.E. 
 
   (1)      (2)   
 (1a)  (1b)  (1c)  (2a)  (2b)  (2c) 
  EMPLOYERS  OWN 
ACCOUNT  NOT S.E.  EMPLOYERS  OWN 
ACCOUNT  NOT S.E. 
MALE                              0.005  0.024  -0.029  0.003  0.018  -0.021 
                                         [2.05]**   [6.27]***  [6.45]***  [1.54]     [5.10]*** [5.12]*** 
FBiH                                 -0.004  -0.002  0.006  -0.004  0.000  0.004 
                                         [1.80]*    [0.57]     [1.51]     [1.54]     [0.09]     [1.07]    
AGE                                 0.002  0.002  -0.005  0.002  0.002  -0.004 
                                         [3.30]***  [2.71]***  [4.14]***  [3.13]***  [2.31]**   [3.79]*** 
AGESQ/1,000                  -0.031  -0.029  0.061  -0.029  -0.022  0.051 
                                         [3.35]***  [2.59]***  [4.05]***  [3.01]***  [2.18]**   [3.60]*** 
URBAN                           0.003  0.004  -0.006  0.003  0.004  -0.008 
                                         [1.10]     [1.03]     [1.45]     [1.27]     [1.32]     [1.80]*   
MARRIED                       0.007  0.004  -0.011  0.006  0.002  -0.008 
                                         [2.23]**   [0.79]     [1.79]*    [1.93]*    [0.52]     [1.50]    
LCHILDREN                   0.000  0.006  -0.005  -0.002  0.004  -0.002 
                                         [0.12]     [1.21]     [0.96]     [0.81]     [1.05]     [0.41]    
EDUCLOW                     -0.005  -0.006  0.011  -0.006  -0.007  0.013 
                                         [2.14]**   [1.74]*    [2.63]***  [2.31]**   [2.45]**   [3.32]*** 
DISABLED                      -0.008  -0.005  0.013  -0.008  -0.006  0.014 
                                         [3.16]***  [0.93]     [2.13]**   [3.52]***  [1.44]     [2.95]*** 
PASTSE                           0.084  0.077  -0.160  0.092  0.053  -0.145 
                                         [2.79]***  [2.52]**   [3.76]***  [2.91]***  [2.17]**   [3.65]*** 
OPTIMISM                      0.029  0.012  -0.041  0.034  0.018  -0.053 
                                         [2.04]**   [0.78]     [1.94]*    [2.43]**   [1.25]     [2.57]**  
NOSOCPTL                     -0.005  -0.017  0.023  -0.007  -0.015  0.022 
                                         [2.41]**   [6.07]***  [6.18]***  [2.93]***  [6.10]*** [6.48]*** 
PENSION                         -0.001  -0.013  0.015  -0.002  -0.006  0.009 
                                         [0.56]     [4.26]***  [3.57]***  [0.78]     [1.56]     [1.65]*   
OTHERSE                       0.005  0.042  -0.047  0.011  0.045  -0.056 
                                         [1.07]     [2.97]***  [3.18]***  [1.80]*    [3.10]*** [3.59]*** 
LHHCONS                       0.011  0.008  -0.019      -           -           -      
                                         [4.52]***  [2.53]**   [4.83]***                                        
INFORMAL                         -           -           -       -0.002  0.021  -0.020 
                                                                             [0.44]     [2.42]**   [2.06]**  
NONEMPLOYED               -            -            -        -0.007  -0.002  0.009 
                                                                             [1.96]**   [0.37]     [1.45]    
INFORMLOAN               -0.005  0.002  0.004  -0.005  0.003  0.002 
                                         [2.29]**   [0.39]     [0.72]     [1.84]*    [0.70]     [0.36]    
MICROLOAN                 -0.001  -0.005  0.006  0.0001  -0.006  0.006 
                                         [0.10]     [0.75]     [0.60]     [0.01]     [1.18]     [0.68]    
BANKLOAN                   0.008  -0.002  -0.006 0.009  -0.002  -0.008 
                                         [1.62]     [0.37]     [0.88]     [1.70]*    [0.33]     [1.08]    
REMITDOM                    -0.004  -0.004  0.008  -0.005  -0.003  0.008 
                                         [1.28]     [0.87]     [1.46]     [1.32]     [0.82]     [1.47]    
REMITABROAD            -0.009  -0.002  0.011  -0.009  -0.001  0.011 
                                         [4.68]***  [0.50]     [2.39]**   [4.48]***  [0.34]     [2.32]**  
GRANT                            0.034  0.049  -0.083  0.024  0.045  -0.068 
                                         [1.23]     [1.54]     [2.12]**   [1.06]     [1.49]     [1.91]*   
SOCIALSERV                 0.0001  0.001  -0.001  0.0001  -0.00004  -0.00004 
                                         [0.03]     [0.24]     [0.21]     [0.03]     [0.01]     [0.01]    
          
97 131  4,823  98  131  5,048 
No. of Individuals            
5,051 5,277 
Log-Likelihood                 -926.3  -935.4 
Wald x2                             277.2***  312.5*** 
 
Source: World Bank LSMS survey (2001-04).  See Table 3 for variable definitions. 



















Table 8: Business Survival Models, Heckman probit with selection  
 
  Working Age Population  Employed in 2001 
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) 
  M.Eff. z-stat M.Eff. z-stat M.Eff. z-stat M.Eff. z-stat M.Eff. z-stat M.Eff. z-stat 
Survival Equation: [Dependent variable: Still Self-Employed one year after the transition/Not (1/0)]    
MALE                        0.011  [1.13]   0.011  [1.33]  0.007  [2.06]**   0.007  [2.15]**    0.008  [2.03]**   0.005  [1.14]   
AGE                           0.004  [1.77]*  0.003  [1.16]   0.003  [3.42]***  0.002  [2.05]**    0.003  [2.37]**    0.001  [1.10]    
AGESQ/1,000           -0.063  [2.06]**  -0.039  [1.37]  -0.039  [3.33]***  -0.028  [2.04]**    -0.038  [2.41]**   -0.018  [1.10]    
FBiH                          0.006  [0.72]     0.004  [0.58]     0.001  [0.04]     0.002  [0.52]     0.006  [1.29]     0.006  [1.31]    
URBAN                     0.018  [1.99]**   0.014  [1.64]   0.012  [2.98]***  0.011  [2.90]***  0.018  [2.90]***  0.016  [2.99]*** 
MARRIED                0.008  [0.72]     0.004  [0.47]     0.007  [1.70]     0.006  [1.08]     0.006  [0.95]     0.001  [0.05]    
LCHILDREN            0.011  [1.08]     0.013  [1.39]     0.001  [0.33]     0.003  [0.59]     0.005  [0.85]     0.008  [1.42]    
EDUCLOW               -0.016  [1.69]*    -0.013  [1.69]*    -0.008  [2.11]**   -0.009  [1.94]*     -0.011  [1.71]*     -0.011  [1.68]*    
DISABLED               -0.019  [1.18]    -0.015  [1.39]    -0.011  [3.10]***   0.001  [0.10]     -0.001  [0.11]     0.002  [0.13]    
PASTSE                    0.036  [1.14]  0.031  [1.05]  0.041  [3.27]***  0.044  [3.24]***    0.046  [2.88]***  0.032  [2.06]** 
NOSOCPTL              -0.010  [0.80]     -0.014  [1.46]     -0.008  [2.32]**    -0.010  [2.50]**    -0.011  [2.28]**    -0.013  [2.21]**   
OTHERSE                 0.058  [3.32]***  0.054  [3.40]***  0.029  [4.21]***  0.037  [5.41]***  0.046  [3.72]***  0.044  [3.83]*** 
LHHCONS                0.016  [2.14]**  0.014  [2.22]**  -  -  -  - 
INFORMAL              -  -  0.014  [2.72]***   0.012  [2.22]**    0.013  [2.45]**    0.015  [2.48]**  
NONEMPLOYED    -  -  0.007  [1.70]*    0.008  [1.40]   -  - 
INFORMLOAN        -  -0.001  [0.01]     -  -0.001  [0.09]     -  0.003  [0.47]    
MICROLOAN           -  -0.002  [0.10]     -  0.003  [0.31]     -  0.008  [0.61]    
BANKLOAN            -  0.020  [1.65]*   -  0.007  [1.24]     -  0.014  [1.69]*   
REMITDOM             -  -0.017  [1.79]*     -  -0.009  [1.52]     -  -0.006  [0.74]    
REMITABROAD      -  -0.003  [0.22]     -  -0.006  [0.85]     -  -0.011  [1.64]   
GRANT                     -  0.066  [1.14]   -  0.038  [1.66]*   -  0.002  [0.11] 
SOCIALSERV          -  -0.012  [1.47]     -  -0.010  [2.38]**   -  -0.013  [2.12]**   
Self-Employment Transition Equation: [Dependent variable: New Self-Employed/Not (1/0)]              
MALE                        0.023  [5.42]***  0.022  [5.57]***  0.016  [4.00]***  0.016  [4.19]***  0.022  [3.38]***  0.022  [3.53]*** 
AGE                           0.005  [4.32]***  0.005  [4.27]***  0.005  [3.72]***  0.004  [3.58]***  0.005  [2.41]**   0.005  [2.37]** 
AGESQ/1,000           -0.064  [4.08]***  -0.059  [4.01]***  -0.054  [3.39]***  -0.049  [3.26]***  -0.062  [2.28]**   -0.057  [2.22]**  
FBiH                          -0.003  [0.85]     -0.005  [1.36]     -0.001  [0.14]     -0.003  [0.64]     0.002  [0.25]     -0.002  [0.23]    
URBAN                     0.006  [1.50]     0.005  [1.32]     0.008  [1.83]*   0.008  [1.93]*    0.023  [2.99]***  0.021  [2.94]*** 
MARRIED                0.007  [1.16]     0.007  [1.20]     0.006  [1.02]     0.005  [0.89]     0.012  [1.23]     0.011  [1.21]    
LCHILDREN            0.004  [0.62]     0.004  [0.73]     0.001  [0.13]     0.001  [0.12]     -0.002  [0.19]     0.001  [0.04]    
EDUCLOW               -0.010  [2.33]**   -0.010  [2.42]**   -0.014  [3.20]***  -0.014  [3.53]***  -0.016  [2.04]**   -0.016  [2.09]**  
DISABLED               -0.016  [2.04]**   -0.015  [1.90]*   -0.012  [2.62]***  -0.001  [0.33]   0.004  [0.67]    0.002  [0.35]   
PASTSE                    0.169  [7.17]***  0.162  [7.11]***  0.155  [6.73]***  0.152  [6.73]***  0.142  [5.29]***  0.138  [5.27]*** 
NOSOCPTL              -0.017  [3.08]***  -0.017  [3.54]***  -0.017  [3.23]***  -0.018  [3.85]***  -0.029  [3.20]***  -0.028  [3.44]*** 
OTHERSE                 0.043  [4.54]***  0.040  [4.38]***  0.053  [5.28]***  0.053  [5.45]***  0.079  [4.41]***  0.077  [4.46]*** 
OPTIMISM               0.052  [2.75]***  0.049  [2.64]***  0.042  [2.45]**  0.053  [3.21]***  0.106  [3.42]***  0.095  [3.16]*** 
PENSION                  -0.011  [2.56]**  -0.011  [2.43]**   -0.008  [2.12]**   -0.008  [2.06]**    -0.014  [2.16]**   -0.012  [1.73]*   
LHHCONS                0.019  [4.76]***  0.019  [4.98]***  -  -  -  - 
INFORMAL              -  -  0.019  [2.85]***  0.020  [3.01]***  0.027  [2.78]***  0.028  [2.85]*** 
NONEMPLOYED    -  -  -0.010  [1.80]*    -0.009  [1.62]     -  - 
INFORMLOAN        -  -0.005  [0.99]     -  -0.004  [0.85]     -  -0.005  [0.57]    
MICROLOAN           -  0.001  [0.03]     -  -0.002  [0.23]     -  0.013  [0.66]    
BANKLOAN            -  0.008  [1.22]     -  0.009  [1.47]     -  0.004  [0.42]    
REMITDOM             -  -0.007  [1.12]     -  -0.007  [1.09]     -  -0.008  [0.65]    
REMITABROAD      -  -0.015  [2.74]***  -  -0.014  [2.45]**   -  -0.028  [3.11]*** 
GRANT                     -  0.077  [3.01]***  -  0.077  [2.98]***  -  0.071  [1.40] 
SOCIALSERV          -  -0.002  [0.57]     -  -0.004  [0.86]     -  -0.012  [1.55]    
        
No. of obs.                 5,007             5,007           5,007             5,007             2,934        2,934            
Censored Obs.           4,823            4,823           4,823           4,823   2,787       2,787           
Log-Likelihood          -792.4        -778.1           -778.1      -767.8           -601.1                    -601.6           
Wald x2                     46.6***     57.2***              114.7***               114.7***         140.2***                      81.9***          
Wald x2 (ind eqs)       3.77*         2.36             3.81*              12.47***             5.71**             21.64***          
 
Source:  World Bank LSMS survey (2001-04).  See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
Notes in Table 6 apply. 





Table A1: Variable names, definitions and sample averages  (World Bank LSMS, 2001-04) 
 
Variable Name  Definition   Mean (S.D.) 
Individual Characteristics:  
MALE  Dummy variable (DV=1/0) equal to 1 if respondent is male  51.3%  (0.50) 
AGE  Age of the respondent in year 2001  35.80 (12.92) 
FBiH  DV  equal to 1 if respondent resides in Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina (0 in Republica Srpska)   55.3%  (0.50) 
URBAN  DV  equal to 1 if respondent resides in an urban area  45.6%  (0.50) 
MARRIED  DV  equal to 1 if respondent is married or cohabiting in 2001  60.9%  (0.49) 
LCHILDREN  Natural Logarithm of declared number of children (natural or not) plus 1  0.66  (0.59) 
EDUCLOW  DV  equal to 1 if respondent has no formal education or primary school education  34.3%  (0.47) 
DISABLED  DV  equal to 1 if respondent considers him/herself disabled  4.6%  (0.21) 
GHEALTH  DV  equal to 1 if respondent evaluates his/her health as good or excellent during the last 12 months, the two top 
categories in the 5-scale Subjective Health Evaluation Question  37.8% (0.48) 
PASTSE  DV  equal to 1 if respondent's first occupation after school-leaving age was self-employed  2.2%  (0.15) 
OPTIMISM  
Index [0,1] produced as the weighted average of the intensity measured by a 4-scale response in 8 mental health 
questions from the GHQ: During the last week how often have you: (1) Felt low in energy, slowed down? (2) 
Accused yourself for different things? (3) Felt you lost appetite? (4) Felt hopeless in terms of the future? (5) Felt 
Lonely? (6) Thought about ending your life? (7) Felt that everything was an effort? (8) Constantly had 
nightmares?   
0.90 (0.11) 
NOSOCPTL 
DV , proxy for individual social capital,  equal to 1 if individual responded “No” to either question: (1) "Is there 
anyone you can count of to listen to you when you need to talk?", (2) "Is there anyone who you can really count 
on to help you out in a crisis?" 
19.6% (0.40) 
OTHERSE  DV  equal to 1 if another member of the household is self-employed in 2001  6.7%  (0.25) 
HINSUR  DV  equal to 1 if respondent receives health insurance, either from work or the Employment Bureau  75.2%  (0.43) 
PENSION  DV  equal to 1 if respondent receives pension insurance, either from work or Employment Bureau, or Centre for 
Social Work  34.4% (0.48) 
Wealth and Financial Characteristics:  
LHHCONS  Natural Logarithm of Total per capita Household Consumption in 2001, deflated at the regional level by regional 
poverty line (Main Welfare Aggregate)  7.83 (0.52) 
POOR  DV (1/0) if a Equivalized Household Consumption in 2001 is less than 2/3 of the median per entity  25.4%  (0.44) 
INFORMLOAN   DV (1/0) if a household member received a loan from a family member, friend or other individual in 2001  17.1%  (0.38) 
MICROLOAN  DV (1/0) if a household member  received  a loan from a microfinance institution or microloan from a credit 
union, co-operative or NGO in 2001  2.5% (0.16) 
BANKLOAN  DV (1/0) if a household member  received a loan from a private or government Bank in 2001  11.6%  (0.32) 
REMITDOM  DV (1/0) if a household member received any money from friends or family working in BiH in 2001  8.5%  (0.28) 
REMITABROAD  DV (1/0) if a household member received any money from friends or family working abroad in 2001  11.4%  (0.32) 
GRANT  DV (1/0) if a household member received money from NGOs or charities in 2001  2.1%  (0.14) 
SOCIALSERV  DV (1/0) if a household member received old age or disability pension, or survivors, war veterans, or war 
disability pensions from the Civil Victims of War Program in 2001  27.5% (0.45) 
Employment Status in 2001: 
EMPLOYED  DV (1/0) if respondent was in paid employment in 2001 (formal or informal)  56.1%  (0.50) 
   FORMAL  DV (1/0) if respondent was a formal sector employee in 2001  35.2%  (0.48) 
   INFORMAL  DV (1/0) if respondent was employed in the informal sector in 2001  20.8%  (0.41) 
NONEMPLOYED DV  (1/0) if respondent was not in paid employment in 2001 (formal or informal)  43.9%  (0.50) 
  UNEMPLOYED  DV (1/0) if respondent declared status as unemployed in 2001  18.8%  (0.39) 
  INACTIVE  DV (1/0) if respondent declared status as student/retired/housewife in 2001  25.1%  (0.43) 
Switch to Self-Employment: 
NEWSE  DV (1,0) indicating that the individual switched to self-employment after 2001  4.29%  (0.20) 
NEWSE-OA  DV (1,0) indicating that the individual switched to own-account self-employment after 2001  2.45%  (0.15) 
NEWSE-EMPL  DV (1,0) indicating that the individual switched to self-employment with employees after 2001  1.84%  (0.13) Table A2: Correlation matrix between key variables (World Bank LSMS 2001-04) 
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